Zaher Baher

24/02/206

The third day of university student protests in Iran continues. The demonstrations began at Mashhad University and, by Monday, had spread to other campuses, including the all-women Al Zahra University. Protesters chanted anti-government slogans, and an Iranian flag was burned and torn. The demonstrations remained confined to university grounds and did not spill into the streets.

The most prominent slogans included “Death to the dictator,” “For every one killed, a thousand will rise,” and “The blood that has been shed will never be erased.” At the same time, the United States and Iran are engaged in talks aimed at easing the threat of war, even as both sides intensify their military preparations

Under these circumstances, people across the region are deeply anxious about the prospect of war, shaped by decades of lived experience with armed conflict. They understand that war offers nothing but hunger, deprivation, the loss of loved ones, and the devastation of land, nation, and environment.

They also recognize that wars justified in the name of “regime change” have rarely delivered freedom or stability. Instead, such interventions have often merely replaced one dictator with another, sometimes producing outcomes even more disastrous. This lesson has been painfully reinforced by their experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and now Syria.

Another concern shared by leftist groups and some others centres on the perceived lack of viable alternatives following the collapse of Iran’s current regime. They argue that, in the absence of a genuine democratic option, the only scenario being promoted is the return of Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s former king, facilitated by external intervention, particularly under the influence of Donald Trump.

In my view, concern about the possible return of Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s former king, is understandable. Such an outcome would be deeply troubling, yet it would be no worse than the continued rule of the mullahs. This position does not imply a desire for war, nor does it signal support for a United States attack on Iran.

However, there is an uncomfortable reality that cannot be ignored. When a government relentlessly pursues authoritarian and fascistic policies and does not hesitate to kill hundreds of thousands of its own people, overthrowing such a regime through demonstrations and peaceful protests alone becomes extraordinarily difficult.

Why is the return of the former king’s son not considered worse than the continuation of the current regime?

First, conditions in Iran have deteriorated drastically under the current rulers, worsening across nearly every sphere of life. Assassinations, killings, kidnappings, and the execution of innocent protesters, as well as anyone who dares to speak out, have become routine instruments of repression.

Women’s freedoms have been severely curtailed to the extent that many women no longer tolerate these restrictions and, in some cases, feel compelled to take to the streets themselves, even when broader solidarity in defence of their rights appears limited.

Second, the collapse of the regime would create a space to breathe freely, even if only for a limited period. A new government would be unlikely to achieve immediate or lasting stability, creating an opening for people to organize themselves across Iran. This moment could allow the formation of mass organizations, trade unions, and a wide range of anti-authoritarian, anti-state, and anti-war groups, as well as women’s unions and numerous initiatives focused on the environment, the economy, freedom, and human rights. Such movements could work collectively to combat poverty, discrimination, and inequality.

Public demonstrations, open debates, and seminars would represent further gains, alongside the revival of press freedom, writing, publishing houses, and the emergence of countless independent publications.

Third, the restoration of self-esteem and collective confidence would be a decisive gain. Rebuilding faith in one another and trust in people’s capacity to stand up for their rights would encourage collective action and the emergence of mass uprisings. Successfully toppling a 47-year-old regime in Iran would instill a powerful sense of empowerment. That experience would not fade easily and would serve as a lasting source of confidence if a new ruling authority attempted to follow the same repressive path as the one it replaced.

Fourth, the fall of the Iranian regime would also mean an end to its support for various Iranian-backed militant groups in neighbouring and Arab countries and a halt to the assassination of regime opponents both inside and outside Iran. Simultaneously, with the collapse of this Shiite stronghold, Saudi Arabia would no longer view it as a critical strategic or military asset. Consequently, the demand for weapons, ammunition, and other war materiel would diminish for both Saudi Arabia and Israel, potentially easing regional conflicts to some degree.

Fifth, the collapse of Iran would significantly undermine the Iraqi regime. It could create an opportunity for the Iraqi people to challenge or even topple their rulers, or at the very least weaken the regime to the point that it can no longer pursue its current policies.

Sixth, the situation in Turkey could become highly unstable. If Iran were able to strike significant damage against U.S. military bases in Turkey with its missiles, it could trigger widespread chaos, potentially sparking large-scale protests and demonstrations. Such unrest would not only impact the Turkish population but could also create opportunities for Kurdish communities, while simultaneously weakening the Turkish regime considerably.

Seventh, the collapse of the Iranian regime could improve conditions not only for Kurds and other ethnic groups within Iran but also for the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. At the very least, the threat of bombings and assassinations targeting opponents of the mullahs would disappear in this part of Kurdistan. Simultaneously, there is a possibility that a new regime would retract from the incursions and abuses previously carried out in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Eighth, the fall of the current religious regime could permanently prevent the re-establishment of a theocratic government in Iran, given the bloody legacy and the profound suffering it has inflicted on Iranian citizens over the past 47 years of its rule.

In my view, the developments outlined above would significantly advance the struggle of Iran’s workers and oppressed, laying the groundwork for a social revolution and helping to eradicate oppression, hunger, and social injustice. They would also provide a crucial opportunity for libertarians and anarchists to forge connections, support one another, and build networks that strengthen self-organization and coordination of their activities.

All of these represent significant milestones and powerful momentum for the growth of the anarchist movement.

Zaher Baher

28/01/2026

The attack by the new Syrian Arab Army, with the support of Turkish forces, on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the seizure of areas under their control caused many killings of SDF members and civilians as well. For the Syrian Arab Army, killing was not enough; they also mutilated the bodies.

In this attack, the remaining ISIS groups within the Syrian army reached a point where they captured SDF fighters, whether alive or dead, and treated them in a barbaric way. On several occasions, the body of a young female fighter in Aleppo, in the Kurdish neighbourhoods of Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyah, was thrown from the third floor of a building. Another young male fighter was killed, after which his body was burned and the ashes were spread everywhere. In another incident, when they killed a young female fighter, they cut her beautiful hair and took it with them. These are only a few examples among many, and videos of these acts have been widely published on social media.

These brutal attacks by ISIS on the Kurdish people in Rojava and its forces, the SDF, on the one hand created a great deal of frustration among Kurds and demonstrated a form of Kurdish unity both abroad and in Kurdistan. At the same time, they created a wave of racism and chauvinism. Similarly, many journalists, intellectuals, and members and supporters of the PKK began to use and repeat racist concepts in their writing and in posts on Facebook. These include the following racist concepts: State of Turks, government of Turks, police of Turks, members of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) of Turks, and gendarmerie of Turks.

All of the above concepts are racist, and many of those who use them are unaware of this or do not know the Kurdish language well. There is undoubtedly a very small minority who understand their meaning very well and use them according to their own interpretation.

In January 2016, I wrote a 12-page article about this racist language and the mistakes of the PKK. I also explained that this language is the language of the PKK, not of Rojava. The media in Rojava of Kurdistan does not speak, write, or promote these racist forms of language.

We also know that PKK leaders know very little, or nothing at all, about the Sorani Kurdish dialect. However, writers, intellectuals, and many Sorani dialect speakers and Facebook users may know the meaning of these concepts, yet they still use them, perhaps because PKK leaders or PKK media use this language and they follow them.

Why is the use of these concepts racist?

First, according to a former MP of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), the proportion of Turks in Turkey is 7 percent. This figure may be incorrect, as some people estimate it to be between 40 and 50 percent. In any case, we know the history of Turkish society since the beginning of the Turkish state. Therefore, the state is not only the Turkish people or a state of Turks; in fact, it is a state of everyone who lives in Turkey. Many of these minorities voted for this government and helped create it.

Second, the majority of DEM Party members in parliament and government are Kurds, not Turks. If they are nothing and not part of parliament, then what are they doing there?

Third, we know that many people in high government positions are Kurds, such as Hakan Fidan, the forging secretary of Turkey. The official spokesman of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Ömer Çelik, is also Kurdish, along with many others whom I do not need to name here. Erdoğan himself is not a Turk. Not only that, but none of the other three candidates who ran for president alongside Erdoğan were Turks.

Fourth, Turkish citizens of any nationality or minority, including Kurds, must perform compulsory military service. They are also employed in sensitive departments such as the police and intelligence agencies, or in service sectors like the courts, education, health, and sports. Many Kurds are among them. So, whether you like it or not, they serve the Turkish state.

Fifth: How do you know that the policeman, soldier, or member of MIT who was killed is a Turk? Have you seen their identity? Do you know their background? Have you looked into their life history?

Sixth: Are you not the ones who say that there are 20 million Kurds in Turkey? What about these 20 million, let us say 14 million of them still live in Turkey? Where do they get their money from, and to whom do they pay taxes? Who do they benefit from? From whom do they receive passports and identity cards? Whom do they serve as police, soldiers, or spies? Of course, they serve the state, and the state supports them in return.

So, as Kurds, you are part of these people and part of this establishment. Turks, Azeris, Arabs, and others living in Turkey have participated in and stabilized the government and the state. Therefore, it is not only Turks who are doing their duty, but every citizen in Turkey, all the communities that make up the Turkish nation. In other words, all support the Turkish state.

Seventh: When you call it the “state of Turks,” you are rejecting everyone from other ethnicities who serve in different parts of this state in Turkey, including yourself, as a Kurdish person. You deny your own existence there. How can there be a land without a nation, when we know that part of Turkey is called Kurdistan? If you believe that the government or state in Turkey is only the state of Turks, and that you are not part of this establishment or society in Turkey and do not belong to it, then why do you fight against it for your rights?

Eighth: If your answer to these points is that the Kurds have been made Turks there, then you are confirming and recognizing the constitution of the Turkish state, which says that there are no Kurds there.

Nine: What remains to be said is that most of us know the state is a tool of class and serves the ruling capitalist class and the elite, including Kurds. The state protects their interests and, at the same time, acts as an institution to suppress its opponents.

Of course, there are other points, but these are the main ones for me. Please stop using racist language. Learn Kurdish before you write articles, publish statements, or become a journalist. Otherwise, you are only sowing the seeds of racism, just as racist Turks and racist Arabs do against you.